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Abstract
In this paper, we describe the requirements for embedding watermarks in images used for identity verification
and demonstrate a proof of concept in security sciences. The watermarking application is designed for verifying
the rightful ownership of a driving license or similar identity object. The tool we built and tested embeds and
extracts watermarks that contain verification information of the rightful owner. We used the human finger print
of the rightful owner as the watermark. Such information protection mechanisms add an extra layer of security
to the information system and improve verification of identification attributes by providing strong security. The
issues of usability and cost are also discussed in the context of the social acceptability of access controls.
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INTRODUCTION
Three authentication attributes are required to verify the rightful ownership of an identity card. These cards are
widely used for access control of human participation in motor vehicle driving, liquor access, library and other
memberships. The extent to which attribution is required is often decided by the risk to be mitigated or by the
usability function (Oligeri, Chessa, Di Pietro, and Gianta, 2011). Risk for motor vehicle drivers is usually more
highly prioritized than gym membership and often attribution for verification is proportional to the risk register.
Usability, however often acts as a moderating variable so that if an attribution activity such as retina scanning or
full fingerprinting is time consuming or socially unacceptable then a lesser or better fitting option is adopted.
(Usability is used throughout this paper to address the human expectations for seamless technology use.)
Usability often determines that a card has a photograph, a signature and a third person referral contact; to which
the verification agent can make visual recognition and or seek further verification by cross referencing from the
other attributions such as requesting a signature, a phone number or contacting a third party. These measures
have cost effective control but are open for improvement and tampering (Nukamura, Katayama, Yamamuro, and
Sonehara, 2004 ).
The more general use of biometric attributes is enhancing the quality of verification but not always satisfying
usability requirements (Sherekar, Thakare, and Jain, 2008). Our proposal is to demonstrate a tool that embeds
the finger print of the rightful owner of a card in the photographic image. Many laptops and mobile devices
these days have finger print scanning inputs that only require a user to run the index finger over a small scanner
or a screen print cell (O'Ruanaidh, Dowling, and Boland, 1996 ). The proposition is that an identity card
embedded with our watermark can also be run across the same canner and the two impressions compared with
software that usually comes free of charge with the operating system. A verification agent would then have two
attributes present (Blanton, Zhang, and Frikken, 2013). Both are quick and easy to process and one presents
strong security. In such a situation a third authentication attribute may not be necessary and the usability of the
security mechanism enhanced (Sherekar, Thakare, Jain, Ashwini, Tijare, Deshpande, 2011).
In this paper we describe the attributes of watermarks and the tool we built for embedding fingerprints into
images. The discussion addresses the risk trade-off between strong security and usability. We conclude that
watermarking accompanied by readily available input surfaces and software is a working solution for identity
authentication and verification processes.

WATERMARKS
A digital watermark can be either visible or invisible and is used to protect from copyright and ownership
infringement. Each selected watermark requires the property of “robustness” where it is resilient to actual and
potential attacks that may destroy the recognition or retrieval of the watermark (Cayre, Fontaine, and Furon,
2005). The aim of watermarking is to introduce small patterns in the target data without changing the original
source. Consequently if there is illegal use of the property the owner can verify ownership of the data (Chroni,
and Nikolopoulos, 2010; Johnson, Duric, Jajodia, and Memon, 2001). The use of a visible or an invisible
watermark (or a combination of both) would satisfy the requirement for protection in an identity card and also
the usability function for speed and utility (Liu, Ma, Zhang, Li, and Chen, 2011). The scope of watermarking
security research can be established by dividing the potential field into its properties and attributes. In figure 1
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the properties are listed as Media; Perceptibility; Robustness; Type; Processing Method; and, Extraction Key.
These properties span the scope of watermark technologies and specify the choices that must be made for
implementation (Chuhong, Kundur, and Kwong, 2006). Each property has few or many attributes that must be
selected for a particular characteristic of watermark for a particular purpose or environment (Zhu, Wei, Xiao,
and Wang, 2009).
.

Figure 1. The Scope of Watermark Research
.

TOOL BUILD
The objective of our tool build was to scan and insert a human finger print into an image. The .bmp file was
assessed an easy format to work with for testing. The test image was chosen randomly from .bmp files freely
available on the web and then the tool applied. We also provided an extraction algorithm for use when a
verifying agent required a comparison of a biometric scan and the embedded watermark. The Embedding details
(see figure 4) show innovation in the exploitation of the three color channels (rather than the usual grey scales)
and the least significant bits being applied to two bits (pixels) instead of the usual one for embedding the bit
stream for the watermark.
The Embedding Algorithm
The embedding algorithm (figure 2) relies on the parallel processes of converting the cover image and the
fingerprint scan into byte arrays. The arrays are computed for size. If a byte array is too large to fit inside the
cover object then the scan is rejected and the process stops to be started again until size compatibility is
satisfied. If the size constraint is satisfied then the array can be converted directly into bits for the grey scales or
the array can be converted to exploit the color channels. Once the size and type of array are stabilized the
algorithm then requires the embedding of the bit streams in the cover object. The embedding process is checked
for completeness and the insertion of the fingerprint bit by bit is finalized.
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Figure 2. The Embedding Flow Chart

The Extraction Algorithm
To extract the embedded watermark the tool was designed for multiple scan interfaces. The design considered
the use of such embedding for multiple instances for identity card reading and of different types of systems.
Hence a public key was made available in the tool that could be invoked at any instance of scanning request.
Once the watermark information was read it was then checked for tampering that may have occurred through
card use or damages and the extent of tampering measured against the PSNR scales to determine if the
watermark was still usable. In the case the watermark had been damaged in some ways but the PSNR was above
30% then the untampered parts could be extracted for use. If no tampering or damage had occurred then the
extracted watermark could be compared with a biometric scan from the present rightful owner and
authentication verified.
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Figure 3. The Extraction Flow Diagram

The Embedding Detail
The embedding detail is explained in figure 4 and relates to the (*) indicated in the figure 2 middle statement
box. The watermark is embedded in the first 100 bytes of the image with a preference for the blue color channel
as being more stable. Consequently the size check in figure 2 is critical. The watermark is broken up into eight
bit bytes and inserted into the image cover object bit by bit starting with bit 0 inserting to blue, bit 1 to red, bit 2
to green and then repeated until the full bit stream representing the fingerprint is embedded. The prior
determination of size assures complete embedding and no loss.
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Figure 4. The embedding Details

RESULTS
The results are shown in the tool forms that report the step-by-step progress through the embedding and
extraction algorithms. Figure 5 reports the successful embedding of the identity card owner fingerprint into the
photographic image. The embedding process was digital but the extraction can be digital or optical depending
on the scan equipment available for use. The image is transferred to an identity card that may be in plastic or
paper forms. The result can then be carried by the card owner and presented for verification. All watermarks
have been stored digitally in the pictures themselves; therefore they can be retrieved by the same system and
methodology or optical systems for authentication purposes. Figure 5 is one example of the multiple forms that
present the process steps toward the completion. Testing of the research output in a simple scanner on a laptop
and on a smart phone showed the test subject could be identified by the authentication attributes on and
embedded in the identity card. In all instances the test subject scanned the index finger on the input devices
available on the computers and then submitted the biometric scan and the watermark scan to the software on the
operating systems for finger print comparison processing. Twenty different subjects were tested and in all
instances the match was made and the rightful owner identified (The PSNR >30% was used for fidelity and
robustness measures as mentioned above). Such results appear elementary but we are also showing that by using
readily available technologies these valuable security processes can be successfully completed. The time to
complete the two scans and the comparison verification took under 20 seconds. Consequently such application
can be socially unobtrusive and easily fitted within usability guidelines for user satisfaction. The added strength
fingerprints embed as watermarks greatly enhances the value of an identity card and the acceptability for
identification.
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Figure 5. Tool Form Output

DISCUSSION
Security access controls present barriers to human actions and in particular participation in benefits such as
motor vehicle driving, alcohol consumption and many other recreation and social activities. Theoretically many
biological and logical access controls are possible and the research of many scientists has shown that the
integration of technologies with the abstractions of security science can deliver controls for human behaviors. In
general, however, less is written about the impact of these security technologies on beneficial human behavior.
For example in most jurisdictions the control of alcohol consumption by age requirements and disposition acts
as a moderating influence for acceptable social behaviors and conduct. The critical turning point is the
successful execution of the control. If the access is granted on a false positive then the potential for anti-social
human behavior is high or if the access is rejected on a false negative then the system itself comes under
scrutiny and it may be causal in a range of anti-social behaviors. Such thinking is often absent from the purely
technical quick fix solutions to security issues. We have attempted to show by design that theory can be
transferred into practice in ways that a full 360 degree appraisal of human behavior is made in conjunction with
the security theory. Beneficial human behaviors may be achieved by setting the initial barrier to action (security
control) in such a way that both the positive and negative attributes of risk are managed towards the required
human behavior. Enhancing the correct verification of alcohol consumers with the type of security features we
describe has a deliverable impact on the consequences of access control. Accurate verification has the advantage
of assuring the greatest number of beneficial behaviors are achieved and the integrity of the security system is
maintained.
The social acceptability of access controls is an unwritten tradeoff between the perceived cost of compliance
and the benefits of non-compliance. The identity card for driving a motor vehicle for example is of high value to
the user and gives access to responsible and beneficial actions. The acceptable performance of human behavior
while in the authorized control of a motor vehicle demonstrates compliance with the expectations for holding
the card. However the same human may calculate the financial cost of renewing a driver’s license and choose
not to renew but pay the consequences. They may choose to ignore the terms and conditions of the license or
have an appetite for risk that negates the purpose of authorizing access to vehicle use. In each instance the
threshold for compliance has a social dimension trade-off that most drivers are prepared to calculate and then
decide the tipping point. An identity card that gives access to a sports club or a bar may not be held in the same
regard and have the same threshold for compliance as a motor vehicle. A human user may resist the same level
of training and testing required of a driver’s license when they are 60 years of age and wish to purchase alcohol.
Consequently the usability of an identity card is a trade-off that is socially calculated at every use. In our
development of the tool we considered the thresholds users may have for compliance. The scanning of eyes for
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biometrics was considered at a higher social threshold than the scanning of one fingerprint. Similarly we
calculated the cost to a service supplier of the access control. Excessively expensive equipment will only be
used under duress and the equipment must be fast, accurate and efficient. Cost has many dimensions and each
must be assessed for the successful implementation of security mechanisms. The availability and the technical
feasibility of a security mechanism may not deliver better security unless the human and social consequences of
the capability are also factored into the solution.

CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the proof of concept that identity card security can be enhanced using software and
hardware that is readily available. The level of detail presented has focused on the design and design attributes
so the feasibility of the model is apparent and not lost with excessive testing output tables. The tool developed
indicates that simplicity in design and attention to the building blocks of images allows a working solution to be
tested. The key points in usability of speed and social acceptability have been addressed. The development of a
fully standardized commercial solution would allow identity verification to proceed in a non-intrusive and time
effective manner.

REFERENCES
Blanton, M., Zhang, Y., and Frikken, K. (2013). Secure and verifiable outsourcing of large-scale biometric
computer computations. ACM Trans. Info & Sys Security, 16, 3 (TISSEC).
Cayre, F., Fontaine, C., and Furon, T. (2005). Watermarking security: theory and practice. In: Signal
Processing, IEEE Transactions on. 53(10), 3976-3987.
Chroni, M. and Nikolopoulos, S. (2010). Encoding watermark integers as self-iniating permutations. In
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Computer Systems and Technology.
Chuhong, F., Kundur, D., and Kwong, R. H. (2006). Analysis and design of secure watermark-based
authentication systems. In: Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on. 1(1), 43-55.
Johnson, N. F., Duric, Z., Jajodia, S., and Memon, N. (2001). Information Hiding: Steganography and
Watermarking—Attacks and Countermeasures. Journal of Electronic Imaging. 10, 825.
Liu, Y.-C., Ma, Y.-T., Zhang, H.-S., Li, D.-Y., and Chen, G.-S. (2011). A method for trust management in
Cloud computing: Data coloring by Cloud watermarking. International Journal of Automation and
Computing. 8(3), 280-285.
Nukamura, N., Katayama, A.,Yamamuro, M., and Sonehara, N. (2004). Fast watermarking detection scheme for
camera equipped cellular phone. (MUM’04).
Oligeri, G., Chessa, S., Di Pietro, R., and Gianta, G. (2011). Robust and efficient authentication of video stream
broadcasting. ACM Trans. Info & Sys Security, 14, 1 (TISSEC).
O'Ruanaidh, J. J. K., Dowling, W. J., and Boland, F. M. (1996). Watermarking digital images for copyright
protection. Vision, Image and Signal Processing, IEEE Proceedings -. 143(4), 250-256.
Sherekar, S., Thakare, V., and Jain, S. (2008). Role of Digital Watermark in e-governance and e-commerce.
International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security. 8(1), 257-261.
Sherekar, S., Thakare, V., Jain, S., Miss Ashwini, D. B., Tijare, P., Deshpande, M. S. A. (2011). Attacks and
Countermeasures on Digital Watermarks: Classification, Implications, Benchmarks. International Journal
Of Computer Science And Applications. 4(2).
Zhu, J., Wei, Q., Xiao, J., and Wang, Y. (2009). A fragile software watermarking algorithm for content
authentication. 2009 IEEE Youth Conference on Information, Computing and Telecommunication, YCICT2009, September 20, 2009 - September 21, 2009. Beijing, China: 391-394.

20

